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This article addresses the contribution of decentralised collective bargaining to the development of 
different forms of flexicurity for different groups of employees on the Danish labour market. Based 
on five case studies of company-level bargaining on flexible working hours in Danish industry, it is 
argued that decentralised bargaining has enabled new balances between flexibility and security to 
develop for many but not all groups of employees. On the one hand, the company-level agreements 
on flexible working hours facilitate greater efficiency and employee satisfaction that often goes be-
yond the text of the agreements. On the other hand, less flexible employees often face difficulties in 
meeting the demands of the agreements and may ultimately be forced to leave the company and rely 
on unemployment benefits and active labour market policies. In a flexicurity perspective, this devel-
opment seems to imply a segmentation of the Danish workforce regarding hard and soft versions of 
flexicurity. 
 
Keywords: Collective bargaining, Working time flexibility, Industrial relations, Flexicurity 
 
 Introduction	 
In recent years the Danish labour market has performed well compared with labour markets in other 
countries, and up untill the financial crisis and concurrent recession Danish key figures were among 
the best in the world (World Bank, 2006; OECD, 2005). Denmark exhibited not only low and stead-
ily falling unemployment, but also rising employment frequencies and high job mobility. This suc-
cess has often been explained by reference to the so-called Danish flexicurity model, which com-
bines high flexibility for employers in the form of easy access to hiring and firing labour with high 
security for employees in the form of a relatively generous unemployment benefits system and an 
active labour market policy that comes into force if one loses one’s job (Bredgaard et al., 2005; 
Madsen, 2004).  
However, behind this story of key figures there is also a reality in which Danes in-
creasingly have been offered other forms of flexibility and have enjoyed other forms of security 
while at work. This has involved the introduction of quite new forms of flexibility, such as working 
time accounts and compressed work weeks, but also a wider dissemination of more established 
forms of flexibility such as job rotation and individual wage supplements. These developments are a 
result of the decentralisation of the Danish collective bargaining system, which has increasingly 
made it possible for management to negotiate flexible solutions directly with shop stewards1 and 
employees at company level (Andersen and Mailand, 2005). The local negotiations are based on 
types of trade-offs other than the Danish flexicurity model, but might also help explain the favoura-
ble developments in the Danish labour market. From this perspective it may perhaps be more mean-
ingful to discuss a number of different forms of flexicurity in the Danish labour market rather than 
to focus solely on a single model.  
The present article sets out to examine how decentralised bargaining contributes to the 
development of different forms of flexicurity parallel with the Danish flexicurity model. The article 
is based on case studies carried out in 2005, in which shop stewards and managers at five Danish 
industrial workplaces were interviewed on the negotiation and effects of their local agreements con-
cerning flexible working hours. The case studies focus on agreements on flexible working hours 
understood as variations in the distribution of working hours (i.e. the use of time accounts). In addi-
tion to an analysis of the case studies the article goes on to discuss these developments seen in an 
international perspective. The question is whether Denmark is moving in the direction of a seg-
mented labour market of the kind that can be observed in certain other European countries. By seg-
mented we refer to the existence of separate labour markets within the same country between which 
 only limited mobility can be observed (Doeringer and Piore 1971; Peck 1996; Reich 2008). If the 
Danish labour market show such signs of segmentation, what are the mechanisms behind this de-
velopment? Furthermore, the article addresses the question whether trends of segmentation has con-
sequences for flexicurity as a concept.  
First, however, the article presents an overview of the forms of flexibility and security 
in the Danish labour market to be found at company level and of the decentralisation of negotiations 
on working hours in the Danish industrial sector. 
 
The Danish flexicurity model – more than a golden triangle  
Both in Denmark and abroad the Danish version of flexicurity has become synonymous with a par-
ticular model, the Danish flexicurity model (Bredgaard et al., 2005: 5-6). The model refers to the 
combination of liberal hire/fire rules (external numerical flexibility), relatively generous unem-
ployment benefits (income security) and an active labour market policy. It has also been dubbed 
‘the golden triangle’ because it has demonstrated considerable explanatory power in relation to the 
positive developments in the Danish labour market from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s, where not 
only a fall in unemployment levels but also an increase in employment rates was observed.2 Conse-
quently,  it was relatively easy for workers in Denmark who lost their job to find new employment 
during that time (employment security).  
Although ‘the golden triangle’ provides an important part of the explanation for the 
development of the Danish labour market, it is not necessarily a sufficient explanation. The regula-
tion of the Danish labour market contains a large number of other forms of flexibility and security 
that contribute to an effective and balanced regulation. The majority of these are implemented via 
collective bargaining in the public and private labour markets (Andersen and Mailand, 2005: 11f). 
This includes sector-based maternity and paternity funds that can make it easier to combine work 
and family life (combination security). It also involves opening clauses that allow local negotiations 
on, among other things, flexible working hours (internal numerical flexibility), which can enhance 
the company’s adjustment to fluctuations in demand and thereby contribute to securing the number 
of workplaces (job security). 
If we expand the flexicurity perspective in this way, it soon becomes clear that some 
forms of security and flexibility are predominately adjusted more centrally between the labour mar-
ket’s parties, while others are primarily agreed at the individual companies. This is a product of the 
decentralisation process in the Danish collective bargaining system, in which collective agreements 
 at sector level have increasingly assumed the character of framework agreements within which 
management and shop stewards can negotiate local solutions (Due and Madsen, 2006: 46). Wage 
increases have been the object of local level bargaining right back to the start of the 20th century 
(pay flexibility), while flexible working hours (internal numerical flexibility) and changes of work 
function (functional flexibility) are more recent phenomena in local negotiations. Furthermore, con-
siderations regarding the employees’ family life (combination security) seem to receive more atten-
tion in local negotiations today.  
In many ways, this decentralisation process can be characterised as an organised de-
centralisation (Due et al., 1994; Traxler, 1995). From the very beginning the process took place 
within the framework of sector-level agreements between unions and employers’ organisations on 
the Danish labour market and this is still the case today. Union densities and the coverage of collec-
tive agreements remain comparatively high in Denmark, where close to seven in ten wage earners 
are organised, and seven in ten are covered by collective agreements (Due and Madsen, 2009). Fur-
thermore,  more than half of Danish companies have on-site union representatives with bargaining 
competencies (Danish shop stewards) present, which suggests that most employees have a solid 
bargaining power in company-level bargaining (Navrbjerg et al. 2010). This has helped minimizing 
unions’ fear that decentralisation of bargaining competencies would result in a deregulation of pay 
and working conditions. Furthermore, Danish sector-level agreements secure local managers and 
shop stewards a de facto right of veto to terminate any local agreement and fall back on the regula-
tions of the sector-level agreements. This has been an important precondition for unions when ac-
cepting such strong delegation of bargaining competencies from the sector level to the company 
level. Table 1 below shows what forms of flexibility and security in the Danish labour market are 
wholly or partially negotiated internally at the individual companies (within the framework of the 
collective agreements/national legislation) and what forms are first and foremost determined exter-
nally. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 1: Internal and external forms of flexibility and security on the Danish labour market 
  
 
Internal forms 
 
External forms 
 
Flexibility 
Internal numerical flexibility 
Pay flexibility 
Functional flexibility 
External numerical flexibility 
 
 
 
Security 
Job security 
(Combination security) 
Employment security 
Income security 
Combination security 
Source: Wilthagen, 20023.  
 
There has been discussion as to whether other forms of flexibility and security should 
be included in the study of flexicurity in the labour market. The discussion has, among other things, 
involved the ‘employability’ of the individual employee (the suitability for employment) and the 
security to be able to choose among different types of jobs (Lescke et al., 2006: 3; Bredgaard and 
Larsen, 2006: 12, 24). This employability security is important because it can indicate decisive dif-
ferences between various groups in a labour market with low unemployment like the Danish labour 
market. When unemployment is low and employment security high, it may be difficult to detect 
possible differences between employees who often change jobs and those who remain in the same 
job for a long time. Finally, the group of employees who change jobs and thereby provide an exter-
nal numerical flexibility may be very heterogeneous. These may both be employees who voluntarily 
seek new and more challenging jobs at higher wages and thereby have no contact at all with the 
Danish unemployment benefit system, or they may be employees who find less challenging jobs at 
lower wages after being fired. 
  
Flexible working hours and decentralisation in the industrial 
sector 
In step with increased international competition flexible working hours (internal numerical flexibil-
ity) has become a more and more important instrument for adjusting labour and demand at company 
level. Whereas formerly the number of hours worked was the dominant issue in collective bargain-
ing on working hours in industry, the main issue today is the timing of the hours (Marginson and 
Sisson, 2004: 274-277). Employers are finding it harder and harder to predict when, and to what 
extent they will need their workforce because fluctuations in demand are becoming both more pro-
 nounced and more asymmetric. At the same time new technology and new ways of organising work 
have opened up opportunities for, and greater employee interest in flexible hours (Navrbjerg, 1999: 
53). The introduction of team work and of flat organisation structures is linked with an increased 
employee influence that make it possible for them to adjust their work and family life in new ways.  
We can distinguish two ways of varying the timing of the hours worked, both (of 
which are) commonly encountered today. Firstly, the scheduling of working hours can be varied, 
which means that in addition to normal daytime work one can, for example, draw upon night, 
weekend or shift work. Secondly, the distribution of working hours, which is the focus of the pre-
sent article, can be varied (Marginson and Sisson, 2004: 274-277). This may be a matter of flexi-
time or other forms of time accounts, in which working hours can be saved up and drawn upon later 
─ typically within the framework of a month or a year. Variations in the scheduling of working 
hours have a somewhat longer history than variations in the distribution of the hours, but the latter 
have become vastly more important over the past 10-15 years. European surveys from 2004/2005 
show that 51 % of all Danish companies use time accounts in some form today (Riedmann et al., 
2006: 4).   
In Danish industry working hours are regulated via the general sector level agreement, 
concluded between the Confederation of Danish Industries (DI) and the Central Organisation of 
Industrial Employees in Denmark (CO-industri), which permits the local negotiation of flexible 
working hours (Industrial Agreement 2007: §9, §12). This possibility has existed with various limi-
tations since first introduced in the 1995 agreement (Navrbjerg et al., 2001: 18). It has subsequently 
been expanded a number of times in connection with an intensive decentralisation process in the 
collective bargaining system. Today local agreements on flexible working hours have become 
widespread in industry. An internal questionnaire carried out by DI in spring 2005 thus shows that 
approximately one-third of their member enterprises had concluded company level agreements on 
working hours within the framework of the sector level agreement.4 One in four of these agreements 
is a local framework agreement under which working hours can be negotiated individually. This 
latter possibility was introduced in 2000, when the two parties in industry also adopted the so-called 
Pilot Schemes (Industrial Agreement 2000: §9, §50). The schemes, which were made permanent in 
the Industrial Agreement 2007, made it possible, provided there was local consent, for management 
and shop stewards to entirely disregard four chapters in the agreement, including the chapter on 
working hours. The introduction of the pilot schemes paved the way for completely new forms of 
company level agreements; nevertheless, it has not contributed significantly to the spread of agree-
 ments on flexible working hours in general. In spring 2006 46 company level agreements were reg-
istered under the pilot schemes, and the reach of such agreements is therefore still fairly limited. 
However, the development of sector level agreements since 1995 does not tell the 
whole story about how both sides of industry began to negotiate flexible working hours at company 
level. The changes in the agreement were largely a reaction to the fact that in the 1980s many com-
panies had already developed and adopted different practices in this field, because intensified inter-
national competition had compelled them to think along new lines. Thus, a survey among shop 
stewards from 1998 shows that at this time up to 27% of all companies in industry had closed so-
called closet agreements (i.e. company level agreements more or less hidden from the sector-level 
parties). The great majority of these agreements concerned working hours (Navrbjerg et al., 2001: 
26-27). Even though the decentralisation of collective bargaining on working hours today appears to 
be a top-down process, initially it resembled more a bottom-up process. 
 
Case studies 
The present article is based on five case studies carried out in 2005 against the background of the 
decentralisation of collective bargaining on working hours in industry. The aim of the studies was to 
illuminate how management and shop stewards negotiated company level agreements on flexible 
working hours in practice. The focus of the investigation was on collective bargaining of a particu-
lar form of flexible working hours, namely variations in the distribution of working hours, and the 
case companies were therefore chosen according to whether they had concluded agreements in this 
particular field. However, in order to secure some variety in the sample, the selection both included 
small and large companies as well as service and production companies.  
Each case study consisted of separate interviews with the chief negotiator on both the 
management and the union sides of the company and of an analysis of all written company level 
agreements on working hours. During the interviews managers and shop stewards were asked about 
the development in the agreements on working hours from the first agreement and onwards (includ-
ing when, how and why the agreements had been concluded), how the agreements had been imple-
mented and what effects of the agreements they had been able to observe. A recurrent question in 
all the interviews was whether the agreements combined flexibility for the company and security for 
the employees. Did both managers and shop stewards characterise the agreements as win-win situa-
tions in which both sides left the negotiating table as winners, or did they primarily refer to them as 
win-lose situations, in which only one of the parties had gained (Walton and McKersie, 1965)? At 
 two of the companies it was not possible to arrange a face-to-face interview with the chief negotia-
tor on the management side (Cases 3 and 5), but a telephone interview was carried out with one of 
them (Case 5). Furthermore, interviews were conducted in an early pilot phase with representatives 
of both DI and CO-industri. Table 2 below gives an overview of the general characteristics of the 
case companies and their collective agreements on flexible working hours. 
 
Table 2: Overview of main characteristics of the case companies 
 
 Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5 
Number of employees 
 
20 100 700 400 6000 
Dominant type of work 
 
Service Service Production Production Production 
Fluctuation in demand 
 
High High/medium Medium High Medium 
Company-level agree-
ments on working time 
1 2 3  1  1 framework 
agreement 
 
Aims of agreements 
Avoid hire and 
fire 
Motivate em-
ployees,  
formalise  
flexibility 
Avoid hire and 
fire, formalise 
flexibility  
Avoid hire and 
fire, reduce 
costs 
Improve 
productivity 
and health 
Lower/upper limits on 
time accounts (hours) 
0 /- - -24/+24 or 
-20/+20 
0/29 -  
 
Main control of time 
accounts in ser-
vice/production 
 
Individual 
employee/- 
Individual 
employee and 
colleagues/-  
Individual 
employee/ 
individual  
employee and 
colleagues 
Individual 
employee/ 
Management 
Individual 
employee/ 
individual  
employee and 
shop stewards 
 
 
Company level agreements on flexible working hours 
At first glance the analysis of the negotiations at the case companies revealed substantial similarities 
in both service and production companies as well as in large and small companies. All companies 
had to struggle with major, and for the main part unpredictable, fluctuations in demand for their 
products/services. They sought to deal with this challenge via locally adapted agreements on flexi-
ble working hours rather than by hiring and firing employees along the way. On the whole, manag-
ers and shop stewards both found these agreements to be an effective instrument for handling the 
fluctuations. That said it was far from being a process without challenges – neither during the nego-
tiations of the agreements, nor during their implementation. Moreover there were other motives 
behind the negotiations than the wish for greater job security, and other consequences were experi-
 enced. In the following we shall present a closer analysis of the challenges and potentials experi-
enced by managers and shop stewards in connection with the company level agreements. 
 
Avoid firing – and avoid hiring  
At three of the case companies shop stewards and managers pointed to the wish to reduce the need 
for hiring and firing as the primary motivation behind the negotiation of flexible working hours 
(Cases 1, 3, 4). Managers were, for instance, interested in avoiding the costs connected with hiring 
new personnel, and shop stewards were, among other things, interested in securing workplaces for 
as many employees as possible. It was therefore not difficult for the parties to develop a common 
interest in an agreement on flexible working hours, because the agreement could benefit both sides. 
However, other factors than management’s interest in avoiding costly new hirings and the shop 
stewards’ interest in preventing dismissals were involved, too. Some of these factors cut across tra-
ditional conflicts of interest between the two bargaining parties.  
At the smaller of the service companies (Case 1) one of the shop steward’s motives 
for concluding a local agreement on flexible working hours was not merely to avoid dismissals but 
actually to avoid new hirings. The company provides a niche service, and in the employees’ view 
new staff who were trained in the same competencies but later dismissed would be potential com-
petitors in the job market and thereby a threat to future job security. The shop steward was therefore 
interested in an agreement on flexible working hours that did not set a limit on how many hours 
could be saved up in the time accounts. In practice, however, the hours piled up to such an extent 
that it was difficult for employees to take time off in lieu, and management therefore became in-
creasingly sceptical about the agreement. Nevertheless, management is still in favour of the agree-
ment because it has meant massive savings on new hirings and has ensured that important compe-
tencies remain in the company: 
 
“One reason is that it takes from six months to a whole year to train a man sufficiently. After that 
there will be work for him for a couple of years, and then he’ll have to be thrown out. The special 
training they get here will in theory make them competitors. In that way we would train people who 
in the worst case could attack this firm, and that might mean jobs. They [the employees] wouldn’t 
have that. That’s why people said at the time that they would rather give it a real bash, and for in-
stance put in two man-years in one year. They do that, and it works.” (Manager, Case 1) 
 
 The chairman of the local union is not satisfied with this development, however, as he would prefer 
the company to hire new staff rather than build up over-sized time accounts. He was formerly the 
shop steward at the company and still has a certain influence on the present shop steward, who has 
rejected management’s wish to pay off the excess of hours. The union has stuck to a provision in 
the company level agreement that not more than 16 hours overtime per month may be paid out in 
wages. The manager has therefore sought to solve the problem in a different way. He has, so to 
speak, made cross-border use of flexible working hours. The company forms part of a major inter-
national company, in which there is a tradition of posting employees elsewhere when there is too 
much work in one place and too little in another. Wages are paid by the original place of employ-
ment, while travel and living expenses are paid for by the receiving company. The Danish part of 
the company has had employees from other European countries and from Southeast Asia on visits 
to help to reduce the backlog of orders. The manager expects in return that he will have to send out 
some Danes in a few years time, when he anticipates a steep decline in demand in Denmark. He 
expresses strong satisfaction with the exchange of employees because it can help to handle fluctua-
tions in demand without competencies seeping out of the company. At the same time he has found 
that the visiting workers have learned a lot from their Danish colleagues so that the cross-border use 
of flexible working hours has also meant a cross-border up-grade of skills. 
The example from the small service company shows that there may be more that 
unites than separates shop stewards and management today in companies with a specifically skilled 
workforce. The employees’ competencies are both their own and the company’s most important 
competitive parameters, and here flexible working hours can be used to secure a competitive ad-
vantage for both parties. This might especially be true when labour markets are tight as it was the 
case in Denmark at the time of study. External numerical flexibility becomes so unattractive for 
both management and employees that they are willing to stretch the internal numerical flexibility as 
far as possible. The example above involves both large fluctuations in the time accounts and inno-
vative cross-border solutions.  
However, employees need not be skilled workers or have participated in internal train-
ing for management to see it as a problem if their competencies disappear from the company. Thus, 
at one of the production companies (Case 4) the management regarded all their remaining employ-
ees as essential resources. The company had been through a number of firing rounds in recent years, 
and in the management’s view it was not possible to lay off any more employees without vital expe-
rience being lost. The pronounced seasonal fluctuations in the demand for the company’s products 
 had hitherto been handled via contract hirings, but the management now wished to make use of 
flexible working hours instead: 
 
“18 months ago there were many more of us here, and now we have cut back so there is only a 
small core left, all of whom have a certain knowhow and core competency, and we very much don’t 
want to fire them. (…) So instead of firing, we ask them to take some more hours when it’s high 
season and to go home and take time off in lieu when we’re not so busy.” (Manager, Case 4) 
 
Self-management of working hours  
There could also be motives behind the negotiation of flexible working hours other than to avoid 
hiring and firing. At all five companies it was, for example, common practice that the employees 
themselves administered their time accounts from day to day – in Case 4, however, this applied only 
for service staff. This meant, among other things, that employees had better possibilities to recon-
cile their work and family life, while management could profit from savings on the line manager 
budget. Therefore, these more informal agreements contained some trade-offs other than immedi-
ately appeared when reading the company level agreements, but they were nevertheless of great 
importance for both management and employees and thereby for the formal negotiations on work-
ing hours. In practice therefore the effects of the flexible working hours extended far beyond the 
text of the written agreements. 
Thus, at the biggest of the service companies (Case 2) there had been oral agreements 
on time accounts all the way back to the 1980s; in the course of time, however, it had been decided 
to formalise them in a written agreement. As it takes about two years to train an employee in this 
company, it has never been an attractive solution for the management to hire and fire staff, and flex-
ible working hours has therefore long been a crucial instrument for tackling fluctuations in demand. 
These fluctuations are very pronounced and unpredictable, and consequently management sees an 
advantage in letting the employees themselves administer their working hours on a daily basis ra-
ther than having expensive line managers to do the same work. The primary motivation for formal-
ising the arrangement was to preserve the employees’ wish to manage their own working hours. 
According to the shop steward, self-management means that the working hours can be adjusted pre-
cisely to the work there is, thus minimising any time wasted, and that employees can adjust their 
working hours to their private needs, for instance vacations and public holidays: 
 
 ”You decide yourself. You yourself know what work you have. If I want to take time off in lieu on 
Friday, then I just send a note to my colleague and the secretary in the office. I don’t ask my man-
agement ─ it’s just something I do.” (Shop steward, Case 2) 
 
The local collective agreement on flexible working hours does not only mean that they can avoid 
hiring and firing. The implementation of the agreement through a self-management of working 
hours by the employees provides both a more effective use of the hours worked and a better recon-
ciliation of work and family life. In this case the agreement thus rests not only on a common interest 
in avoiding hiring and firing, but also on a common interest in letting employees manage their 
working hours themselves. This has two implications. Firstly, the case suggests that it is insufficient 
to assess the effect of local negotiations solely on the basis of the wording of concluded agreements. 
It is also necessary to look at how agreements are implemented, since crucial trade-offs may have 
developed on the shop floor that impact the overall balance of the agreements. Secondly, the case 
presents a complex trade-off that involves internal numerical flexibility, job security and combina-
tion security along with a number of other advantages for management and employees such as few-
er line managers, a more effective use of working time and greater employee satisfaction. This 
complexity makes it difficult to distinguish management interests from employee interests – espe-
cially because they cut so much across the different elements in the agreement.  
 This complexity is also to be found at the smaller service company (Case 1) and at 
two of the larger production companies (Cases 3, 5), where in the same way the working time is 
primarily managed by the employees themselves. Here, too, shop stewards and management were 
interested in using company level agreements to establish ‘reasonable conditions’ regarding self-
management of working hours so that this advantageous practice could be maintained. At one of the 
production companies (Case 3) management and shop stewards decided, for example, to further 
develop their agreement on time accounts, so that it was no longer possible to save up unlimited 
quantities of hours on one’s time account or to be correspondingly in debt. This stemmed from a 
recognition that some employees had difficulty administering their working hours themselves. For 
instance they could accumulate a large deficit of hours that it was very hard for them to work off 
again. Furthermore, managers and shop stewards sometimes found that on leaving the company 
employees had large deficits or savings on their time accounts, which they either had to work off 
before they could draw unemployment benefits or which were expensive for the company to dis-
burse.  
  
The majority sets the agenda  
Even though all five companies had developed complex trade-offs on flexible working hours that 
benefited both management and employees at many levels, it had for certain companies been some-
thing of a battle to reach that point. This was rarely due to conflicts between shop stewards and 
managers, who as already mentioned had attained a very high degree of consensus on the agree-
ments’ form and content. The conflicts more often arose between actors on the employee side.  
At one of the production companies (Case 4) the management and the leading shop 
steward had tried to introduce flexible working hours for a number of years. They were facing a 
high demand for the company’s products in the spring, whereas demand was low in the autumn. 
During the spring season management therefore had to hire extra personnel on a contract basis, and 
these workers were expensive to train for such a short period of time. Both managers and shop 
stewards thought this could be avoided and more workers could be hired on a permanent basis if the 
fluctuations were handled via time accounts instead. A majority of the employees were, however, of 
a different opinion, and the shop steward found it hard to convince them that it was a good idea to 
conclude an agreement on flexible working hours. They were reluctant to work extra in the spring, 
when the weather was good, and to take time off in the autumn, when the weather was not so good. 
Furthermore, one of the other shop stewards disagreed strongly with the leading shop steward on 
this question. She represented a group of employees on the production side, among whom there 
were many lone mothers, and it was not possible for them to practise the flexibility asked for. They 
simply had too little room for manoeuvre to be able to concentrate overtime in such a long period of 
time. 
It was only after a number of firing rounds that a majority of the employees were pre-
pared to vote yes. This was not only due to the fear of dismissal, but also to the fact that the number 
of female employees – including lone mothers – had been strongly reduced in consequence of the 
firing rounds. However, the agreement was not as far-reaching as the leading shop steward and 
management wished, and the company still has to hire a not insignificant number of employees on a 
contract basis in the busy period. Although both parties are aware that they will never be entirely 
able to avoid such hirings because of the size of the fluctuations, the shop steward still expresses a 
wish to reduce their number substantially: 
 
“We’d very much like to have a calm workplace. A workplace that didn’t fire so many people. 
What we’ve got now, that’s in and out. In January, for instance, we might take 100 workers in and 
 fire them again in August. There we’d rather have a wavy movement that goes up and down, in 
which we could take time off in lieu in the autumn and then tackle the extra hours in the spring.” 
(Shop steward, Case 4) 
 
Developments in the local negotiations at this company show that agreements on flexible working 
hours are not necessarily a win-win situation for all groups of employees. It is not everybody who 
has sufficient room for manoeuvre in their daily lives to be able to benefit from an agreement that 
will lead to large fluctuations in their weekly hours. Commitments outside work set limits for the 
flexibility employees can offer their workplaces. Lone mothers are, for instance, very dependent on 
the opening hours at schools and day-care institutions and are therefore particularly unable to be 
flexible. Since this company, as opposed to the four other case companies, only offers employees in 
the service department a considerable degree of influence on the daily administration of working 
hours, it might appear probable that a greater degree of self-management of working hours for em-
ployees in production could solve the problem for the lone mothers. The idea is of course that a 
more individual adaptation of working hours could make it possible for less flexible groups to re-
main in a company and a job where the demand for flexibility is high.  
Considering the nature of the fluctuations it does not, however, seem likely that this 
would solve the problem completely. Because of the pronounced seasonal fluctuations the overtime 
extends over a long period in which there is very little possibility of time off in lieu along the way. 
This accords poorly with a flexibility capacity amounting to an hour more here and an hour less 
there. At one of the other production companies (Case 5), where the production workers have great-
er influence on the administration of their own working hours, the shop steward has for example 
had to acknowledge that employees with very small children often find it hard to live up to the 
company’s flexibility requirements. The fluctuations have very different rhythms at the different 
production locations in this company, and it has therefore been agreed to conclude a framework 
agreement on working hours for the entire company, under which individual production locations 
and departments can negotiate a locally adjusted solution. This gives the shop steward the possibil-
ity of moving newly fledged parents to the departments or locations in the company where the fluc-
tuations are smallest and more evenly distributed. Unfortunately this has not always proved feasi-
ble, and in some cases employees have had to leave the company.  
The need to adjust company level agreements on flexible working hours within the 
company is also to be found in another of the production companies (Case 3). Here they have cho-
 sen to negotiate separate agreements on working hours for three different groups of workers be-
cause their job functions exhibit very different fluctuations in working hours. One of the company’s 
production locations has moreover been permitted to arrange the beginning and end of the work day 
to accord with local traffic conditions. Here, however, the primary motivation is regard for the em-
ployees, who formerly had to wait around in the mornings because the bus timetable fitted in badly 
with the company’s operating times. The management and the shop steward have also discussed the 
possibility of adopting a framework agreement for the company, under which employees can 
choose to negotiate individual working time agreements with the management. The shop steward 
sees a certain potential in the project because it will open up further flexibility without necessarily 
compelling all employees to work flexibly. In the shop steward’s view there may, however, also be 
a fear that employees will feel pressured into entering into such agreements to be sure of their jobs 
in the company. 
The above examples show that no matter how much the agreements on flexible work-
ing hours are adjusted to employee and company requirements, this may not necessarily work for 
all. Even though the agreements have a strong effect in relation to reducing the need to hire and fire, 
management may still need to have a certain marginal labour force if the fluctuations are very pro-
nounced. Conversely, the agreements may have a positive effect on the reconciliation of work and 
family life for some groups of employees at the same time as other groups may experience just the 
opposite. Under the right conditions the development of internal numerical flexibility may increase 
job security and combination security, but not necessarily for everyone. Managers and shop stew-
ards try to find the pivotal point at which both the company and as many employees as possible will 
benefit from the agreements, but there may be groups of employees who cannot provide and there-
fore cannot benefit from flexible working hours. Irrespective of the agreements’ balanced content, 
the effects of the agreement is not experienced as flexicurity for all employees involved.  
One of the companies we have been in contact with in a different context had a very 
palpable experience of the limits to adjustment. Against the background of strong seasonal fluctua-
tions an agreement was concluded on flexible working hours, as in Case 4, with an accumulation of 
saved hours in one half of the year (42-hour week) and time off in lieu in the other (32-hour week). 
In this connection individual female employees were exempted from the agreement, as they would 
otherwise be unable to take and fetch their children to and from their day-care institutions. In one of 
the production departments, however, the agreement led to a dramatic rise in the number of long-
term sickness absences, especially among the oldest staff. The work involved hard manual labour, 
 and the employees were simply unable to cope physically with an extended working week over a 
lengthy period. In consequence the agreement on flexible working hours was dropped after the first 
year. 
 
Summary and conclusions  
 
Flexicurity at the company  
The case studies show that the decentralisation of collective bargaining in the field of working 
hours has facilitated the development of complex trade-offs so that today flexible working hours 
figures as an effective instrument that can benefit both management and employees. The decentrali-
sation has made it possible for the negotiating parties to use variations in the distribution of working 
hours as a mechanism for reducing the need to hire and fire. Managers and shop stewards find it 
easy to develop a common interest in securing as many jobs at the company as possible through the 
use of internal forms of flexibility because many workers in Danish industry possess knowledge and 
experience that are of critical importance for their employers – they are in brief, core workers. This 
stimulates the development of a form of flexicurity internally at the company based on the interac-
tion between internal numerical flexibility and job security rather than on the interaction between 
external numerical flexibility and employment security, as is pointed out in connection with the 
Danish flexicurity model.  
Furthermore, the implementation of local agreements on working hours in practice 
give rise to benefits other than just savings on training and increased job security. Here, the flexicu-
rity balances at the companies go beyond the texts of the agreements in both form and scope. Thus, 
at four of the companies the agreements are largely administered by the employees themselves, 
which gives rise both to an increased combination security and a more effective use of the hours 
worked. To a high degree these benefits draw on earlier practices, but they have been expanded and 
extended under the framework of the company level agreements. The agreements establish ‘ordered 
conditions’, so to speak, so that it is clear for everyone what the rules are. This may strengthen the 
employees’ motivation for managing their working hours themselves and adjusting them to both the 
company’s and their own needs. 
 Local agreements on working hours producing internal forms of flexicurity is not sole-
ly a Danish phenomenon. A number of European case studies demonstrate how management and 
workers’ representatives develop extensive working time agreements that benefit both the company 
 and the employees (Ozaki, 1999: 129-134; Haipeter and Lehndorff, 2005: 142; Seifert and Massa-
Wirth, 2005: 218, 224-226). However, both the case studies presented in this article and most other 
European examples are characterised by two aspects of significant importance. Firstly, the agree-
ments presenting internal flexicurity arrangements on working hours are found in companies with a 
significant amount of skilled and/or experienced workers. Whether or not this is the result of educa-
tional activities or of long cut back processes only leaving the most qualified workers behind this 
raises the question whether internal forms of flexicurity can be developed as easily in companies 
with less qualified workers. Managers do not depend as much on an unqualified (and replaceable) 
workforce as a qualified one, and therefore managers might be less motivated to develop agree-
ments that benefit workers with low qualification levels. Secondly, it must be underlined that most 
case studies on local agreements on working hours (including those presented here) have been con-
ducted in unionised companies with workers’ representatives or shop stewards present. This high-
lights the importance of employee bargaining power when developing agreements that lead to inter-
nal forms of flexicurity. In countries like Denmark, where union densities, coverage of collective 
agreements and presence of shop stewards remain high, most skilled and/or experienced workers 
are well represented at local level and hold the potential of concluding working time agreements. 
However, there might be substantial groups of skilled/experienced workers in less organised set-
tings, who do not posses the bargaining power to negotiate such agreements. In Germany, for in-
stance, union densities and the presence of works councils have been declining over the last decades 
leaving especially employees at SME’s with little bargaining power towards management (Hassel 
1999; Dribbusch 2005).  
 
Hard versus soft forms of flexicurity  
In step with the efforts made by companies to handle the increasing fluctuations in demand via 
company level agreements on flexible working hours some companies have, however, had to rec-
ognise that though flexible working hours are a necessary instrument, they are not sufficient to 
solve the problem. Such agreements can mean a marked reduction in the need to hire and fire, but it 
is not certain that they can entirely eliminate it. Firstly, the fluctuations may be of a nature and ex-
tent that make it difficult to deal with them via flexible working hours. It is therefore still necessary 
now and again to cut into the permanent workforce and to hire staff on temporary contracts. This 
need to combine internal and external forms of flexibility is also encountered at companies in other 
European countries. Thus regional surveys among companies in Germany, England, Spain, France 
and Italy show that fluctuations in demand are tackled both through hiring and firing and through 
 flexible working hours and changes of job functions (McIlroy et al., 2004: 303-307). Secondly, not 
all groups of employees can offer the same degree of flexibility. Even though managers and shop 
stewards try to strike a balance that takes account of the flexibility capability of the greatest possible 
number of employees, there may be groups that for family or age reasons cannot obtain the same 
benefits from the agreements. Some groups of employees may therefore be obliged to leave their 
jobs more or less voluntarily and enter into more external trade-offs in the Danish flexicurity model.   
Although we should keep in mind that this study is based on a limited number of cas-
es, this seems to suggest that the dividing line for employees between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ fol-
low not only their qualifications but also their possibilities for being flexible. There are indications 
that the employees who are able to provide a high degree of flexible working hours are becoming an 
increasingly important resource for the companies, and that shop stewards are able to negotiate 
‘soft’ forms of flexicurity for these groups of employees (internal numerical flexibility, job security 
and combination security). Conversely, there are examples showing that it is the less flexible em-
ployees who are consigned to ‘hard’ trade-offs outside the company, as they might lose their job 
and receive unemployment benefits instead (external numerical flexibility and income security). 
Even though it can be argued that both flexible and less flexible employees experience 
balances of flexicurity, the content of these balances seems widely different. The groups that work 
for many years in the same job provide other forms of flexibility and enjoy other forms of security 
than the groups that often (and involuntarily) change jobs. In other words, there is a difference be-
tween working flexibly and being flexibly employed. It is beyond the scope of the present study to 
be able to say precisely where the employees who are excluded from the companies go in the Dan-
ish labour market. At the time of the study, Danish unemployment was at a historical low, and it 
was relatively easy to find work, but the selection processes during the later financial crisis and 
economic recession are likely to have made it more difficult for excluded workers to find new jobs. 
Some might find new jobs, but the question is of course in what sector and on what conditions. 
Others might disappear entirely from the labour market and go over to sickness, incapacity or early 
retirement benefits. Nevertheless, the trend points in the direction of a greater segmentation of the 
Danish workforce with regards to ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ forms of flexicurity, which may be of decisive 
importance for the future mobility and employment rates on the labour market.  
More than one of the case studies shows that the local adjustment of working hours at 
individual production locations/departments (and the self-management of hours) is essential for 
both management and employees to benefit from the agreements. Flexible working hours are not 
 ‘one size fits all’ even within the same company, and the implementation of the company level 
agreements in practice is therefore of crucial importance for the composition of their effect. This is 
connected not only with local variations in how the demand fluctuates and in the employees’ gen-
eral flexibility capability, but also with the flexibility in the surrounding society (bus and train 
schedules, opening hours at day care institutions, etc.). The question is, however, whether an in-
creased local adjustment and an increased individual adjustment of the working hours are sufficient 
solutions in the case of those workers that risk exclusion. First of all, this group of workers is very 
heterogeneous. Employees are less flexible due to a number of reasons (age, family obligations, 
transportation options etc.). Secondly, some of these employees might also find it difficult to obtain 
permanent employment due to other reasons than their flexibility capacity. For instance, studies 
have shown that immigrants have to make do with ‘hard’ forms of flexicurity to a far greater extent 
than other groups in the Danish labour market (Ejrnæs, 2006). Thirdly, there are limits to the extent 
to which working hours can be adjusted to individual needs as the needs of colleagues must also be 
considered.  
Whether or not employees are consigned to ‘hard’ trade offs due to their flexibility 
capacity or due to other reasons, it seems important to maintain a focus on how both the soft and the 
hard trade-offs develop. This is especially true when it comes to securing the future employability 
of those who work flexibly and for the flexibly employed as their training options can be very dif-
ferent (Keller and Seifert, 2005: 320). Employees with limited flexibility capacity might receive 
less training than employees who are able to work very flexible hours, which can turn a lack of flex-
ibility into a lack of skills. The workers in the periphery of the workplace may for example miss out 
on the possibilities for further training offered by the companies and thus find it more difficult to 
remain attractive for employers than the core workers. A new fund for further training in the indus-
trial sector (Industriens Kompetenceudviklingsfond), which was set up as part of the 2007 sector-
level agreement, may give supplementary training a powerful boost and thereby strengthen employ-
ability security for core workers. The fund gives all employees the right to two weeks’ further train-
ing of their own choice each year. The trend in the active labour market policies and further training 
offers to which the peripheral workers are more likely to be referred does not seem to be moving in 
the same direction. Here user payment has increased and the activity level has fallen (Jørgensen, 
2007: 81-83). Conversely, it is also important to compare the content and not just the financing of 
the further training offers. Experience from Germany shows that further internal company training 
 may be of such a specific nature that employees with high seniority have difficulty in finding em-
ployment elsewhere after being fired (Schulten et al., 2002). 
 
Discussion and perspectives  
 
Insiders and outsiders on flexibility 
The results from the case studies are not unique in a European context. The increased international 
competition and the decentralisation of collective bargaining seems to be creating a corresponding 
two-way movement in many other countries: on the one hand companies are becoming more and 
more dependent on the employees that possess vital competencies and experience, and on the other 
hand they are being forced to introduce flexibility in different forms (internal and external) to pre-
serve their competitiveness. In many European countries (including Denmark) we can therefore 
observe the paradox that job mobility is increasing at the same time as a roughly constant share of 
workers remains in the same job. The rise in job mobility must therefore be ascribed to certain 
groups in the labour market (Auer and Cazes, 2003: 25).5 This development has been linked to an 
increase in hiring on fixed-term contracts. Especially in countries like Germany, where a strong 
employee protection via collective agreements and legislation makes it difficult (and expensive) for 
employers to hire and fire employees (Keller and Seifert, 2005: 306; Bosch, 2004: 623; Romans and 
Hardarson, 2005: 7). In the German case, many of these workers on fixed-term contracts are hired 
in companies taking care of functions outsourced from companies focusing on skilled work only 
(Palier and Thelen 2010). However, irrespective of whether short seniority (less than one year) is a 
result of fixed-term contracts or of dismissals from open-ended contracts, it is possible to observe in 
many countries a trend towards a division of the workforce into a group that is hired for shorter pe-
riods and a group that is employed for longer periods at the same workplace. This has an effect on 
what employers and employees expect of ─ and wish to invest in ─ one another (Marsden, 2004: 
662-668; Stone, 2004: 88f). It could therefore be maintained that we are moving towards a labour 
market in which the bonds between managers and employees are becoming stronger for some 
groups in the labour market and weaker for others. A new and looser social contract is manifesting 
itself at the same time as the traditional manager-employee relationship is being strengthened.  
 Nevertheless, trends of so-called dual labour markets are not a new but a continuous 
and highly persistent phenomenon (Piore, 1971; Rubery, 1978). They might change quantitatively 
and qualitatively, but they tend to survive both economic booms and economic crises like we have 
 seen during the 2000s. Furthermore, we both find trends of dual labour markets in Liberal Market 
Economies (LME’s) like the US and in labour markets of Coordinated Market Economies (CME’s) 
like Germany, although the composition of the dividing lines may differ (Keller and Seifert, 2005; 
Reich, 2008). According to insider-outsider theory, a key explanation to this ongoing creation and 
reproduction of dual labour markets is internal power struggles among employees. The core argu-
ment of this theoretical perspective is that insiders (employed, organised and skilled workers) seek 
to negotiate high transaction costs to keep outsiders (unemployed, un-organised, un-skilled work-
ers) out of their company (Atkinson, 1987; Peck, 1996; Lindbeck and Snower, 2001). If hiring, fir-
ing and training initiatives are expensive for employers, they will be less likely to replace expensive 
insiders with less expensive outsiders. This also means that insiders have a better platform to obtain 
higher wages through collective bargaining (Dobbie, 2006; Häusermann and Schwander, 2009). 
 The case studies presented in this paper suggest that this power struggle among em-
ployees not only follow the traditional dividing lines between insiders and outsiders, unionization 
and skills, but also the flexibility capacity of the employees. In fact, a skilled and organised em-
ployee might risk losing his/her job, if he/she cannot meet the flexibility requirements of an agree-
ment on working hours. This means that struggles between different groups of insiders also can 
contribute to the production of outsiders. During their extensive study of company level bargaining 
in the US, Walton and McKersie identified such struggles as intra-organisational bargaining  
(Walton and McKersie, 1965: 281-293). When local managers and union/workers’ representatives 
negotiate  they not only have to come to agreement with each other but also with those they repre-
sent. However, especially union/workers’ representatives often find it difficult to coordinate bar-
gaining objectives as workers typically form a heterogeneous group with no clear hierarchy. The 
representatives can form coalitions that represent the majority of workers, but it is difficult to satisfy 
all groups. Therefore, the sub-process of intra-organisational bargaining includes a mechanism of 
exclusion that can turn insiders into outsiders. When collective bargaining is decentralised from 
sector level to the company level this increases the number and scope of local negotiations and 
thereby potentially contributes to this segmentation process. Whether or not local bargaining pro-
cesses result in exclusion at the single company depend on many factors -  the composition of the 
employees, the number and types of agreements concluded and the implementation of the agree-
ments in practice. However, the risk is always there, as intra-organisational bargaining form an in-
tegrated part of any collective bargaining process.  
 
  
On the road towards a broader and more critical approach to flexicurity 
A division of the labour market in relation to ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ forms of flexicurity may also have 
consequences for the use of flexicurity as a concept. Some might argue that it does not make sense 
to speak of a Danish flexicurity model or of flexicurity at all if trends of segmentation can be ob-
served that indicate little mobility between insiders and outsiders on the labour market. However, 
the existence of soft forms of flexicurity does not seem to question the existence of hard forms (i.e. 
the Danish flexicurity model). Workers excluded from the soft forms are still entitled to unemploy-
ment benefits or social assistance when fired. Furthermore, the cases presented and analysed in this 
article have illustrated how the concept of flexicurity can offer important analytical insights when 
studying the composition of and the mechanisms behind segmentation. Here, the concept has helped 
us identify important differences in flexibility and security between different groups of workers. 
 The findings support a broader use of flexicurity and a stronger focus on flexicurity as 
an analytical concept that can be applied to the study of any group on the labour market. Although 
the concept originally was formulated as a policy in The Netherlands back in 1995, the concept was 
quickly adopted by researchers and used in analyses of European labour market regulation (Wiltha-
gen, 1998: 10f; Klammer and Tilmann, 2001; Wilthagen, 2002: 4). In the beginning, politicians as 
well as researches reserved the concept for the flexibly employed. The agenda was to focus on secu-
rity for those groups that provide the hardest forms of flexibility on the labour market. Since then 
the concept has been used more broadly in research and has been applied to analyses of groups in 
the labour market other than the flexibly employed (Andersen and Mailand, 2005; Bredgaard and 
Tros, 2006). This makes good sense in the light of the case studies presented above. It is possible 
that to retain a narrow definition of the concept is to do the flexibly employed a disservice. There 
may well be important differences between flexicurity for the flexibly employed and flexicurity for 
employees who work flexibly, differences that one does not see if one looks exclusively at the flex-
ibly employed. This suggests a broader use of the concept of flexicurity, not least in comparative 
studies of flexicurity for different groups in the labour market. 
 This also means that it might be fruitful to use the concept in fields that have tradi-
tionally been the preserve of other theories. Our analysis of decentralised negotiations on working 
hours has in this case illustrated that the concept can contribute to a better understanding of the 
overall balances between flexibility and security at company level – and thereby of the difference 
between the total gains of the core workers and the exclusion of the peripheral workers. The flex-
icurity concept seems to supplement traditional IR bargaining theory, which often focuses on the 
 negotiation of formal written agreements and their content, with a focus on informal trade offs. 
These trade-offs might influence not only the total effects of agreements, but also future negotiation 
processes. They can have a longer history than the written agreements and constitute a framework 
for the negotiations, but they can also be developed as the agreement is translated into practice. It 
therefore seems entirely necessary to take their contribution into account if one wishes to identify 
the real differences in the flexicurity balances in the Danish labour market. 
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Notes 
 
1
 Shop stewards (in Danish: tillidsrepræsentanter) are present at most companies in Denmark. They are elected among 
union members at the workplace and usually have extensive bargaining competencies.  
2
 In the period 1997-2006 unemployment thus fell from 7.9 % to 4.5 % among job-seekers between the ages of 16 and 
66, while the employment frequency rose from 71.9 % to 73.6 % in the same period (Source: Statistics Denmark, 
www.statistikbanken.dk). 
3
 The titles of the individual forms of flexibility and security have been taken from the so-called ‘Wilthagen matrix’, 
which presents an overview of the most relevant forms in a flexicurity context (Wilthagen, 2002: 6). 
4
 We obtained access to the result of the internal questionnaire during an interview in June 2005 with a representative 
from DI. 
5
 European questionnaires show that while the proportion of the European workforce with more than 10 years’ seniority 
in their present jobs remained relatively stable from 1992 to 2000, the proportion with less than one year’s employment 
rose substantially. The European average for the share of employees with more than 10 years’ seniority in their present 
job was 40.7% in 1992 and 41.1 % in 2000. The percentage of employees with less than one year’s employment in their 
present job rose from 14.9 % to 16.8 % in the same period. This trend was also evident in Denmark. Here the share of 
employees with more than 10 years’ seniority was 33.6 % in 1999 and 31.1 % in 2002, while the percentage of employ-
ees with less than one years’ employment was 17.9 % in 1992 and 23.0 % in 2000 (Auer and Cazes, 2003: 25). 
  
 
 
 
